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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(k) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review consist of the 
following: 
1. Whether substantial evidence exists in the record 
in support of the trial court's finding of fact that Healey was 
in material breach of the terms of the Memorandum Agreement by 
refusing to convey his interests in an entity known as Income 
Fund, by his breach of fiduciary duties owed to Prince and by his 
conditional delivery of certain real property interests. 
Standard of Review: Substantial evidence standard; 
Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1992) . 
2. Whether the trial court's refusal to grant Healey's 
request for specific performance of the Memorandum Agreement 
following Healey's breach of the Memorandum Agreement and breach 
of his fiduciary duties to Prince was incorrect. 
Standard of Review: Correctness standard: Grayson 
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
3. Whether substantial evidence exists in the record 
in support of the trial court's findings of fact that Healey 
S:\dwj\25369 1 
converted and otherwise misappropriated property of the 
partnership. 
Standard of Review: Substantial evidence standard: 
Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee objects to the form and content of Appellant's 
Statement of the case. 
This case involves a claim by appellant (Healey) for 
specific performance of a contractual agreement entitled 
Memorandum Agreement against appellee (Prince). By means of a 
Counterclaim Prince sought recovery of damages based on 
conversion and breach of contract from Healey and an accounting 
of partnership business. 
The case was tried before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick on March 23, 24 and 25, 1993. The trial court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it denied 
Healey's claim for specific performance and granted Prince 
judgment against Healey for conversion of partnership assets and 
breach of contract. 
Following denial of Healey's motion for a new trial, 
Healey brought the present appeal from the decision of the Third 
District Court. 
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Because Healey's appeal questions the sufficiency of 
the evidence before the trial court, a recitation of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented on appeal would entail 
marshalling the entire evidentiary basis for the trial court's 
findings of fact. Healey has failed to set out any statement of 
facts in Appellant's Brief and has failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings. 
Because of the nature of the appeal, Prince has 
incorporated the determinative facts with citation to the record 
directly into his arguments. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
FIRST ARGUMENT: Healey has failed to marshal the 
evidence before the trial court on the question of Healey's 
tender of his interests in an entity known as Income Fund. The 
evidence before the trial court supports the finding that Healey 
did not tender said interests. Based on that evidence and 
Healey's failure to marshal, the trial court's finding of fact 
should be upheld by this Court. 
SECOND ARGUMENT: Based on the trial court's findings 
of fact that Healey was in material breach of the Memorandum 
Agreement and in breach of fiduciary duties owed to Prince, the 
trial court's conclusion of law denying Healey's request for 
specific performance and dismissing that claim was not incorrect. 
THIRD ARGUMENT: Substantial evidence presented at 
trial supports the trial court's finding that Healey's failure to 
transfer the Income Fund interests constituted a material breach 
of the Memorandum Agreement and his intentional concealment of 
his intent to withhold those interests were done in bad faith. 
FOURTH ARGUMENT: Delivery of quit-claim deeds to 
Prince upon the condition he execute a promissory note not 
required by the terms of the Memorandum Agreement was not an 
absolute tender of those deeds. Substantial evidence exists in 
s:\dwj\25369 4 
the record to support the trial court's finding of a conditional 
delivery. 
FIFTH ARGUMENT: Substantial evidence which was not 
marshalled by Healey exists in the record in support of the trial 
court's findings of fact that Healey converted partnership 
property relative to his receipt of distributions from Income 
Fund and the partnership ventures and receipt of investor monies 
belonging to the partnership. 
SIXTH ARGUMENT: Under the facts of the present case 
and Healey's material breach of the Memorandum Agreement the 
trial court's decision to deny Healey specific performance of 
that agreement was not in error. Healey's failure to establish 
the value of the partnership assets transferred by him foreclosed 
the trial court and this Court from granting Healey any recovery 
under his Amended Complaint. 
FIRST ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACT THAT HEALEY MADE NO TENDER 
OF THE INCOME FUND INTERESTS IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE 
To successfully attack a trial court's findings of 
fact, a party must first marshal all the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that, even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the findings. See Warner v. Sirstins, 
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838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah App. 1992). See also Crouse v. Crouse, 
817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). 
The rule in Utah is well established that if the 
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the evidence supports the findings of the trial 
court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the 
case. See Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah App. 1992) 
(quoting from Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)). 
In the present case, appellant has made no effort to 
marshal the evidence that supports the trial court's findings of 
fact. Instead, appellant refers this Court to those portions of 
the record which he alleges support his factual assertions and 
claims that the evidence is simply nonexistent to support the 
trial court's findings (Brief of Appellant, pp. 17, 22, 25). 
There is simply no basis for appellant's claim that no 
evidence exists to support the various findings of fact contested 
by appellant and his failure to marshal the evidence represents 
sufficient basis for this Court's summary denial of this appeal. 
At findings of fact no. 12, the trial court found that 
Healey did not make a tender of any interests or assets involving 
an entity known as Income Fund, Ltd. (Income Fund) or make an 
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unconditional tender of certain quit-claim deeds to property 
owned by the partnership. (R. 428 1 12). 
The evidence in the record that supports that finding 
consists in part of the following: 
(1) Healey's direct testimony that Income Fund was not 
transferred to Prince (R. 660 L. 16-17); 
(2) The fact that Healey instructed his attorney, 
Brent Armstrong, to send a demand letter to Prince in the name of 
Income Fund demanding payment of $696,500 (R. 692 L. 9-21; 834 L. 
2-9) ; 
(3) The fact that Healey claimed that a fictitious 
family partnership owns the 71 limited partnership units that 
Prince claims should have been transferred (R. 710 L. 6-9; R. 73 3 
L. 22-25; R. 734 L. 18-25); 
(4) The fact that Healey claimed that Income Fund did 
not fall within the terms of the Memorandum Agreement (R. 789 L. 
2; 815 L. 1-7; 842 L. 22-24); 
(5) Healey's actions as general partner of Income Fund 
in filing a lawsuit against Prince to collect the $696,500 (R. 
835 L. 7-9); 
(6) Prince's testimony that the Income Fund interests 
were not tendered to him (R. 876 L. 20-23; R. 902 L. 4-7); 
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(7) Prince's testimony that he stopped making payments 
because Income Fund and the quit-claim deeds were not delivered 
to him (R. 877 L. 4-5; 882 L. 24-25; 883 L. 22-25; 885 L. 3-7); 
(8) Prince's testimony that he did not receive 
notification from Healey's attorney, Brent Armstrong, after he 
stopped making payment that Healey was willing to transfer Income 
Fund (R. 901 L. 18-25); 
(9) Prince's testimony that prior to trial he would 
have resumed payments if he got what he bargained for (R. 902 L. 
1-3) . 
Instead of marshalling this or any other evidence, 
Healey argues that, through counsel, he told Prince that Income 
Fund would be included in the transfer (Appellant's Brief, p. 9 ) . 
In support of this argument, Healey refers the Court to the 
testimony of Healey's attorney, Gary Henrie. 
Mr. Henrie did testify that he spoke with Healey about 
the issue of the transfer of Income Fund. (R. 843 L. 22-25; 844 
L. 1-4). And, Mr. Henrie testified that he told Prince's counsel 
that Income Fund would be included in the deal if Prince 
performed his end of the deal (R. 847 L. 22-25) . 
However, by not marshalling all the evidence, Healey 
has failed to disclose to this Court that these statements were 
made by Mr. Henrie sometime around September 30, 1991. (R. 847 
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L. 6-12). Following those statements, Prince made the 
installment payments called for in November and December 1991. 
(R. 884 L. 21-24). Nor does Healey point out that Prince stopped 
making those payments because he had not received the Income Fund 
interests. (R. 385 L. 3-7). Finally, Healey fails to direct the 
court's attention to other portions of Mr. Henrie's testimony 
that directly contradict his claim that the Income Fund interests 
were tendered. For example, Mr. Henrie testified that 
discussions were held wherein Healey was willing to make Income 
Fund part of the transaction based on concessions by Prince. (R. 
842-843 L. 25, 1-3). 
And, Healey fails to inform this Court that Mr. Henrie 
testified that Healey withdrew his prior offer to make Income 
Fund part of the transaction. (R. 848 L. 9-13). 
Healey's claim that the Income Fund interests were 
tendered to Prince after the monthly installments were 
discontinued is simply not supported by the record. In fact, the 
overwhelming evidence contradicts that position and supports the 
trial court's findings of fact that no tender was made. Healey's 
failure to marshal that evidence is not based on the lack of 
substantial supporting evidence as he claims, but rather is 
simply a ploy used by Healey to try and obfuscate the true facts. 
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Prince believes that Healey's argument of tender has 
not been presented in good faith. At the inception of this 
lawsuit, Prince made his claim to the Income Fund interests 
crystal clear. In response to the filing of the initial 
complaint and its subsequent amendment, Prince brought a motion 
to dismiss based on Healey7s refusal to convey the Income Fund 
interests and make an unconditional tender of the quit-claim 
deeds (R. 32-65) . In support of that motion, Prince submitted 
his sworn affidavit wherein he stated that Healey had failed and 
refused to convey the Income Fund interests. (R. 35). 
Healey filed a memorandum in response to Prince's 
motion to dismiss and a personal affidavit in response to that 
motion. In neither of those pleadings did Healey mention any 
tender of the Income Fund interests. (R. 66-87). Instead, 
Healey argued that Prince's assertion that Healey was required to 
transfer limited partnership shares purchased in the name of the 
Healey family partnership was ludicrous. (R. 71-72). 
In his affidavit, Healey represented that he was 
willing and able to tender the quit-claim deeds in question to 
the court for disposition as the court deems fit and proper, but 
made no similar tender of the Income Fund interests. (R. 74-78). 
Instead, Healey presents four paragraphs in his affidavit 
detailing the history of Income Fund and arguing that it was not 
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a jointly-held asset subject to transfer under the Memorandum 
Agreement. (R. 76-78). At no point in his argument or affidavit 
does he claim a tender was made of the Income Fund interests. 
The fact of the matter is that Healey did not tender 
his limited and general partnership interests in Income Fund to 
Prince. Prior to the court's entry of its decision, Healey 
claimed that the 70 Income Fund limited partnership units in 
question were owned by a family partnership in which he held no 
interest. (Healey's Affidavit, R. 76-78; R. 662 L. 1-3; R. 662 
L. 10-12; R. 67 L. 18-19). 
Healey made his wife testify that she was the general 
partner of the alleged family partnership even though she had no 
documents that supported the alleged fact of its existence, had 
never filed a tax return for the partnership, had never received 
any distributions in the name of the partnership, and had no 
partnership bank account. (R. 922 L. 17-20; 925 L. 18; 926 L. 1-
13) . 
The court rejected this family partnership claim and 
found that Healey was the true owner of the limited partnership 
units in question (R. 43 0 H 13) and that all of the Income Fund 
interests in question should have been conveyed to Prince under 
the terms of the Memorandum Agreement. (R. 431 % 21). 
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The final evidence of Healey's bad faith in presenting 
this tender argument is presented by a letter sent to Prince's 
counsel by Gary Henrie. As explained above, during his trial 
testimony, Mr. Henrie states that Healey was willing to make 
Income Fund part of the transaction based on concessions being 
given by Prince. (R. 843 L. 1-3). At trial, Prince offered into 
evidence a letter dated November 9, 1991, from Mr. Henrie to 
Daniel W. Jackson. (Exhibit No. 23). The court refused to admit 
the letter on the grounds that the paperwork going back and forth 
between the lawyers was not relevant to the issue in dispute. 
(R. 635 L. 20-25; 630 L. 1-13). 
Prince made that letter a part of the record when he 
attached a true and correct copy of it to his memorandum filed in 
opposition to Healey's motion for new trial. (R. 491-496) . At 
the second full paragraph of the second page of that letter (R. 
4 92), Mr. Henrie advised counsel for Prince that the Memorandum 
Agreement did not include any Income Fund interests and that 
Healey needed to be compensated by Prince if those interests were 
going to be transferred. Obviously, these are the concessions 
that Mr. Henrie testified about. 
On the next page of that letter, Mr. Henrie informed 
counsel that the prior offer to transfer the Income Fund 
interests for additional consideration was retraced (R. 493). 
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Again, on the next page of that letter, Mr. Henrie reiterated 
that Healey would retain the Income Fund interests. (R. 494). 
The record in this case clearly evidences that Healey 
did not tender the general and limited partnership interests 
which he owned in Income Fund to Prince. At all times leading up 
to trial, Healey held fast to the position that Income Fund was 
not covered by the Memorandum Agreement and that he did not own 
the limited partnership interests in question. Both Healey and 
his counsel are aware of the content of Mr. Henrie's November 9th 
letter which withdrew Healey's prior offer to transfer the Income 
Fund interests upon the payment of additional consideration by 
Prince .-f 
The trial court's findings that Healey did not tender 
the Income Fund interests and therefore, was in breach of the 
Memorandum Agreement, is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record and should be affirmed on appeal. 
-' The Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires at Chapter 13 Rule 3.3 that 
a lawyer has a professional responsibility of candor to the tribunal that 
continues to the conclusion of the proceedings. Healey's argument that he made 
an ongoing, unconditional tender to Prince of the general and limited partnership 
interest which he held in Income Fund is so totally contrary to the undisputed 




BASED ON HEALEY'S MATERIAL BREACH OF THE MEMORANDUM 
AGREEMENT AND OTHER EQUITABLE REASONS THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY DISMISSED HIS CLAIM FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Throughout the trial, the trial court and counsel 
stated and restated that Healey was seeking specific performance 
of the Memorandum Agreement. (R. 301 L. 19-25; R. 802 L. 8-14). 
Specific performance is an equitable remedy, and the trial court 
is granted wide discretion in applying and formulating it. See 
LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). In LHIW, 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a party seeking equity 
must do so with clean hands and that specific performance will 
not be granted to a plaintiff who is unwilling to perform. Id. 
at 963. 
In Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court explained that as a predicate to 
the equitable relief of specific performance, a party must 
exercise reasonable efforts to discharge his own obligations and 
the party seeking specific performance has the burden of 
convincing the trial court that he has discharged those 
obligations. See also Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 
514 (Utah 1980) . 
Under this standard, specific performance was not 
available to Healey if the court determined that Income Fund fell 
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within the terms of the Memorandum Agreement. Based on the clear 
and unambiguous language of that agreement and the evidence 
before it, the trial court made a specific finding of fact that 
all of Healey's limited partnership interests, general 
partnership interests and associated interests and assets were 
governed by that Memorandum Agreement. (R. 431 % 21). The trial 
court found further that Healey was required as part of the 
parties7 agreement to convey those interests and assets to 
Prince. (R. 43 K 21). 
Finally, at paragraph 10 of its findings of fact, the 
trial court found that Healey refused to convey those interests 
and assets and refused to disassociate himself from the 
operations of Income Fund. (R. 427-28 % 10) . 
Healey has not challenged any of these findings on 
appeal. Based on these specific findings and Healey's failure to 
discharge his obligations under the Memorandum Agreement, the 
trial court correctly concluded that Healey was not entitled to 
specific performance of that contract. 
At trial, Healey's counsel appeared to be confused 
about the legal standard applicable to a claim for specific 
performance. Specifically, he attempted to present testimony on 
the value of Income Fund to support his argument that its value 
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could be offset against the monies to be paid by Prince. For 
example, during his examination of Healey, Mr. England stated: 
Obviously they're making an issue out of whether Income 
Fund was included or not. I need to ask you now. 
Assuming that Judge Frederick determines that Income 
Fund was to be included and that you've breached the 
agreement by not including it, do you have a way or a 
method of placing a value on Income Fund? 
(R. 823 L. 8-13). 
Similarly, when examining Prince, Mr. England stated: 
I'm going to ask you the same question I asked Mr. 
Healey. Let's assume that Judge Frederick determines 
that you're entitled to Income Fund and that since Mr. 
Healey's didn't transfer it that you're entitled to an 
offset. What do you think the value is of Income Fund. 
(R. 877 L. 19-24) . 
In response to this approach, the trial court informed 
Mr. England that it was not going to reform the parties' 
agreement but rather was going to determine whether or not and to 
what extent one or the other of them committed a breach. (R. 879 
L. 20-23). 
Having found that Healey was in breach of the 
Memorandum Agreement and had breached the fiduciary duty he owed 
to Prince, the trial court correctly refused to grant Healey's 
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request for specific performance and dismissed that cause of 
action.^7 (R. 440 1 20) . 
THIRD ARGUMENT 
HEALEY7S FAILURE TO TRANSFER HIS INCOME FUND INTERESTS WAS A 
MATERIAL BREACH OF THE MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT 
At Point II and Point VI of Appellant's Brief, Healey 
argues that his failure to transfer the Income Fund interests to 
Prince did not constitute a material breach of the Memorandum 
Agreement. 
In part, the argument presented in Point II repeats 
Healey's prior tender argument. Once again, instead of 
marshalling the evidence that supports the trial court's finding 
that Healey did not make an ongoing tender of those interests, 
Healey again refers the court to that portion of the record which 
he believes supports his position. As Prince detailed above, 
Healey's tender argument is meritless and brought in bad faith. 
The rest of Point II is concerned with the trial 
court's finding that Healey's intentional nondisclosure of his 
desire to retain the Income Fund interests was done in bad faith 
(R. 434 U 31). Healey confuses that finding with the trial 
-' The trial court concluded that Healey's breach of the fiduciary duty owed to 
Prince constituted another basis for the dismissal of that cause of action. (R. 
439 H 16) . 
Therefore, the court relied on two separate basis for its denial of Healey's 
request for specific performance and the dismissal of that claim. 
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court's conclusion of law No. 13(c) which states that Healey 
breached the fiduciary duty he owed to Prince in part by 
withholding his intention to retain the Income Fund interests. 
(R. 438). 
Conclusion of law no. 13(c) is based upon the trial 
court's finding of fact no. 30. (R. 433-434 % 30). That finding 
states: 
Healey had an affirmative duty to disclose his 
intention to retain the various interests in Income 
Fund and Income Leasing and related assets to Prince 
prior to the execution of the Memorandum Agreement. 
Healey failed to fulfill that duty and thereby breached 
the fiduciary duty he owed to Prince. 
Healey has failed to question that finding which is 
fully supported by substantial evidence. For example, Healey 
testified that he knew that the Income Fund interests would not 
be included in the interests that he was going to convey prior to 
the execution of the Memorandum Agreement (R. 790 L. 9-14). And, 
although he expressly disclosed to Prince that certain other 
assets in which they held ownership interests would not be 
conveyed, he never told Prince that Income Fund would not be 
included. (R. 791 L. 24-25; 792 L. 1-2). 
This evidence establishes that Healey was aware of his 
intent not to transfer Income Fund prior to the execution of the 
Memorandum Agreement. In Utah, partners occupy a fiduciary 
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relationship and must deal with each other in the utmost good 
faith. See Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982). 
In Burke, the Utah Supreme Court held that a breach of 
fiduciary duty occurs if one partner falsely represents or 
conceals matters from the other partner in relation to his 
acquisition of that partner's interests. Id. at 1017. Thus, the 
law imposes an affirmative duty upon a partner to make full 
disclosure of relevant information to the other partner when the 
partners are dissolving their partnership. 
In the present case, Healey performed all of the 
accounting for the parties' various businesses and had control 
over the actual books and records of those ventures. (R. 766 L. 
8-25; 720 L. 9-21). Additionally, Healey testifies that he 
dedicated 70-75% of his time to running the restaurants while 
Prince spent probably 20-25% of his time involved in the business 
of the partnership. (R. 622 L. 2-4). 
At trial, it was obvious to everyone, including the 
court, that Healey had a much greater understanding of the 
intricacies of the parties' business than Prince. As Prince 
explained in relation to his request for all-inclusive language 
in the Memorandum Agreement: 
I was keenly aware of my inability to know 
all the business. Those were lots of entities and they 
were almost only known to Fred. I mean, not that I 
S:\dwj\25369 19 
just didn't know them. I know I couldn't remember all 
of them, think of them all. . . . 
(R. 881 L. 5-9). 
Based on the role of the two parties in the partnership 
business and the superior knowledge of partnership affairs held 
by Healey, the trial court was justified in imposing an 
affirmative duty of disclosure upon him. Healey's failure to 
disclose his personal decision to retain the Income Fund 
interests certainly constituted a breach of that duty. Once the 
duty to disclose and the concealment of a fact is established the 
next question before the trial court was whether that concealment 
was done innocently or in bad faith. 
In the present case, the court found that Healey's 
concealment of his intent to withhold the Income Fund interests 
was done in bad faith. That determination is a question of fact. 
In Utah, the standard for overturning factual findings is a 
rigorous one and the appellate courts may not set aside a finding 
of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. See Saunders v. Sharp, 
793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1992). 
As stated previously, to establish clear error an 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the finding and 
then demonstrate that despite that evidence, the trial court's 
finding is so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
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weight of the evidence. Id. at 931. As the Utah Court of 
Appeals explained in Saunders: 
This burden "is a heavy one, reflective of 
the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on 
disputed facts." 
Id. at 931 (quoting from In re Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989) ) . 
In relation to the trial court's finding of bad faith, 
Healey has failed to marshal any evidence and that finding must 
be assumed to be supported by substantial evidence.-7 
Supporting evidence exists throughout the record. A 
review of the evidence that supports the trial court's finding of 
bad faith could go on ad nauseam. One example is the fact that 
Healey's original written offer of July 8 included those entities 
in which the parties were co-guarantors such as Income Fund. (R. 
652 L. 21-25, 653 L. 1-2). Healey testified that his later oral 
-' Substantial evidence does exist in support of the trial court's finding on 
that issue. For example, at trial Healey took the position that his 
interpretation of the language found in the Memorandum Agreement excluded 
entities that the parties owned an interest in but in which Prince did not 
exercise control over. (R. 788 L. 16-24). This alleged interpretation was 
parroted by Healey's attorney, Brent Armstrong. (R. 688 L. 23-24). 
In direct contradiction of this interpretation, Healey transferred to Prince 
all of his interests in an entity named Duff's West although Prince was not an 
officer or director and had no control over that entity. (R. 658 L. 22-24) . If 
Healey's alleged interpretation of the clear and unambiguous language of the 
Memorandum Agreement made "joint control" the determining factor, then why did he 
convey Duff's West (an entity in which Prince had no control) to Prince. 
Obviously, the trial court found Healey's testimony regarding this and numerous 
other issues lacking in credibility. 
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offer of August 14, which was accepted by Prince was not intended 
to include the co-guaranteed entities. (R. 653 L. 6-15). The 
only entity that was excluded by that alleged change was Income 
Fund. 
Healey's failure to marshal the evidence requires this 
Court to conclude that the trial court's finding of bad faith is 
supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. 
In the last paragraph of Point Six Healey argues that 
his failure to convey the Income Fund interests was not a 
material breach of the Memorandum Agreement. In support of that 
argument, he states that the only evidence before the court as to 
the value of Income Fund was his testimony that he would purchase 
or sell that entity for $50,000. The argument continues that 
since it was only worth $50,000 his failure to convey it was not 
a material breach. 
In its findings of fact, the Trial Court found that 
Healey received annual distributions of $15,600 from Income Fund. 
(R. 430-431 U 20). Those distributions included annual 
accounting fees of $300 per month (R. 429 H 16), annual 
distributions for his limited partnership units of $7,000 (R. 429 
H 17; R. 43 0 *h 18) and general partnership distributions of 
$5,000 annually. (R. 430 % 18). These findings (which have not 
been appealed from) were based on Prince's introduction of copies 
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of the actual distribution checks Healey received by Healey and 
deposited into his personal account. (R. 729-752). 
The trial court found that Healey's retention of the 
interests and assets involving Income Fund would deprive Prince 
of a significant portion of what he bargained for and agreed to 
purchase and would unjustly enrich Healey. (R. 434 % 32). This 
finding is supported by substantive evidence. That evidence 
includes the testimony of Healey and his attorney concerning 
Healey's demand that Prince pay Income Fund $696,500. (R. 692 L. 
13-21, Exhibit 54). 
This demand for payment was based on the existence of a 
lease agreement between Income Fund and one of the Ponderosa 
Restaurants (the Roy Ponderosa) under which that restaurant was 
obligated to pay Income Fund an annual lease payment of $42,000 
for the use of its equipment. (R. 762 L. 3-20). Healey 
testified that he and Prince personally guaranteed the lease 
payments from the Ponderosa Restaurant to Income Fund. (R. 782 
L. 1-84; 831 L. 22-24). 
Healey testified further that the Roy Ponderosa entered 
into three leases with Income Fund for a total of 20 years at an 
annual lease rate of $42,000. (R. 832 L. 9-13). Fifteen years 
are remaining under the terms of those leases. (R. 832 L. 19). 
Healey testified that Prince guaranteed those lease payments and 
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under the terms of the Memorandum Agreement indemnified Healey 
against paying anything on their joint guarantees. (R. 832 L. 16-
25; 833 L. 4-11). 
The total of the remaining lease payments equaled the 
$696,500 contained in the demand letter. (R. 833 L. 21-24; 834 
L. 2-4) . 
Under these facts, as testified to by Healey, Healey 
would have the personal right to receive annual distribution 
payments totalling $234,000 for a 15 year period or a lump sum 
payment of $201,985.00 ($696,500 multiplied by 29% which is the 
percentage of Healey's limited and general partnership units 
relative to all Income Fund units). 
As Prince testified, he had no idea that Income Fund 
was such an income source for Healey. (R. 8 96 L. 19-16) . When 
asked about the significance of Income Fund, Prince testified 
that the income stream derived by Healey was fifty percent or 
more of the amount that Prince had agreed to pay Healey in 
monthly installments under the Memorandum Agreement. (R. 877 L. 
9-17). 
In addition to this significant cash flow which would 
have come directly from Prince or one of his restaurants, the 
intangible factor of Healey remaining involved with Prince in the 
role of lessor was important in Prince's mind. (R. 896 L. 7-16). 
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It appears obvious that the court took this evidence as 
substantial, credible evidence of the value of Income Fund. 
Clearly, the court did not rely on Healey's self-serving 
testimony that the value of those interests were merely $50,000. 
A breach of contract is material if it goes to the very 
substance of the contract and defeats the object of the parties 
in entering into the contract. See McKeon v. Williams, 799 P.2d 
198, 200 (Or. App. 1990). In McKeon the Oregon Court of Appeals 
set forth three factors to be considered in determining if a 
breach is material. They are (1) the extent to which the injured 
party will obtain the substantial benefit which he reasonably 
could have anticipated; (2) the extent to which the injured party 
may be adequately compensated in damages for lack of performance; 
and (3) the wilful, negligent or innocent behavior of the party 
failing to perform. Id. at 200. 
Application of each of these factors in the present 
case leads to the inescapable conclusion that Healey's 
intentional withholding of the Income Fund interests constituted 
a material breach of the parties' agreement. However, in the 
present case, Healey's withholding of the Income Fund interests 
does not stand alone as the basis for the court's conclusion that 
Healey materially breached the parties' agreement. The trial 
court's conclusion of law in question was based upon Healey's 
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refusal to convey those interests and Healey's failure to 
disclose his prior financial self-dealings. When those elements 
are combined there is no question that a material breach 
occurred. 
FOURTH ARGUMENT 
HEALEY'S DELIVERY OF THE QUIT-CLAIM DEEDS CONDITIONED ON 
PRINCE'S EXECUTION OF A PROMISSORY NOTE WAS NOT A VALID, 
ABSOLUTE TENDER OF THOSE DEEDS 
Healey's argument at Point Five of Appellant's Brief is 
not determinative of the present appeal, but is another example 
of Healey's misapplication of the actual facts to relevant legal 
principles. In his Fifth Argument, Healey contests the trial 
court's finding and conclusion concerning three quit claim deeds 
that Healey was required to deliver to Prince. 
The disputed question of fact before the trial court 
was whether or not the delivery of the deeds Healey was 
conditional or absolute. Healey argues again that there was no 
testimony upon which the trial judge could base his finding that 
the original delivery was conditional. Once again, Healey fails 
to marshal the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. 
Instead, Healey relies on limited portions of Gary 
Henrie's testimony to support the claim that the delivery of the 
deeds in question was absolute. Mr. Henrie testified that he 
delivered the deeds in conjunction with a letter dated September 
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30, 1991. (Exhibit 17). (R. 844 L. 19-23; 845 L. 1-14). In 
relation to those specific deeds, Mr. Henrie stated in his 
letter: 
The delivery of these deeds to Mr. Prince is 
conditioned upon the performance by Mr. Prince of all 
obligations and duties he has under the Memorandum 
Agreement. These duties include the execution and 
return of the documents described in the numbered 
paragraphs above . . . 
(R. 845 L. 21-25; 846 L. 1) (emphasis added). 
The first numbered paragraph, referenced in the above-
quoted passage, calls for the execution of a secured promissory 
note in the original face amount of $425,000. (Exhibit 17). 
Under questioning by Healey's counsel, Mr. Henrie testified that 
it was his understanding that the September 3 0 letter was not 
altering or amending the original Memorandum Agreement. (R. 849 
L. 24-25; 850 L. 1-2). 
Healey relies on that testimony to the exclusion of all 
other evidence to support his claim that the deeds were 
absolutely as opposed to conditionally delivered. Healey relies 
on this evidence notwithstanding the trial court's statement that 
the letter speaks for itself and limiting Mr. Henrie's answer to 
whether in his mind the letter included any additional terms. 
(R. 849 L. 18-23). 
Upon redirect examination by counsel for Prince, Mr. 
Henrie testified that he had not reviewed the Memorandum 
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Agreement for some time and did not know if the agreement 
required Prince to execute a promissory note. (R. 850 L. 14-19). 
However, on further questioning Mr. Henrie admitted that 
execution of a promissory note was different than the exact 
language of the Memorandum Agreement. (R. 850 L. 22-25; 851 L. 
1-2) . 
In addition to Mr. Henrie's testimony, Mr. Brent 
Armstrong who acted as an attorney for Healey in the negotiation 
of the Memorandum Agreement testified that the Memorandum 
Agreement did not contain language requiring the execution of a 
promissory note. (R. 676 L. 21-25). 
Taken together, the evidence before the Court provides 
absolute evidence that the deeds in question were delivered 
condi t ionally. 
FIFTH ARGUMENT 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS IN THE RECORD IN SUPPORT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT HEALEY CONVERTED PARTNERSHIP 
PROPERTY 
The issue of marshalling evidence is raised again in 
Points Four and Five of Appellant's Brief. A great deal of time 
at trial was spent introducing documentary evidence on the issue 
of monies received by Healey from the partnership ventures. 
Prince introduced into evidence each check received by 
Healey from Income Fund. Those checks included distributions for 
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the limited partnership units which the trial court ultimately 
determined were owned by Healey, and distributions for the 50 
general partnership units that Healey held in Income Fund. 
(Exhibits 36-49) . 
Regarding Exhibit 39, Healey testified that the copies 
of checks contained therein represented checks received by him 
from Income Fund. (R 751 L. 17-25). In relation to Exhibit 41, 
Healey testified that the distribution check in the amount of 
$125.00 was made out to the corporate general partner and 
deposited into Healey's personal account. (R. 756 L. 9-21). He 
testified further that he received another check at the same time 
in the amount of $1,125 representing the distribution from Income 
Fund for the general partnership units which Healey held 
personally. (R. 756, L. 19-25; 757 L. 1-20). 
Each exhibit from 3 9 through 4 9 contained two identical 
checks which represented the distributions received by Healey as 
a result of his claimed ownership of the Income Fund general 
partnership units. (R. 774 L. 5-25). This documentary evidence 
established conclusively that Healey received quarterly 
distributions of $1,250 from Income Fund for the general 
partnership units for a total of 11 quarters. This represented a 
total of $13,750 received by Healey based on the Income Fund 
general partnership units. 
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The record reflects that Income Fund was created by 
Prince and Healey as a means of raising capital to pay off a 
joint debt that the parties had incurred as a result of the 
closure of one of their restaurants. (R. 663 L. 3-25; 664-666). 
One of the issues before the court in this case was how 
Healey obtained those general partnership units and what was the 
basis for his entitlement to the general partnership 
distributions totalling over $13,000. When questioned on this 
issue, Healey testified that he did not pay cash for those units. 
(R. 705 L. 7-14) . Upon further examination, Healey explained 
that he and Prince owned certain restaurant equipment equally as 
partners and sold that equipment to Income Fund. (R. 706 L. 18-
25; 707 L. 1-6). 
In exchange for his one-half interest in that 
equipment, Prince received one-half of the cash paid by Income 
Fund for the purchase of the equipment. (R. 707, L. 7-10). 
However, for his identical one-half interest in the equipment, 
Healey received one-half of the cash paid by Income Fund and all 
the general partnership units. (R. 709 L. 3-16). 
Based on the testimony of Healey, the trial court made 
its finding of fact no. 19 which states that the general 
partnership units were issued in consideration for the transfer 
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of an unspecific, undesignated portion of restaurant equipment 
owned equally by Prince and Healey. (R. 43 0 % 19). 
Because the general partnership units were obtained in 
exchange for property of the partnership they became partnership 
property and any distributions traceable to those units should 
have been split equally between Prince and Healey. The evidence 
showed that Healey received all the general partnership 
distributions and deposited them in his personal checking 
account. 
At paragraph 20 of the trial court's findings of fact, 
the court found specifically that Healey received those checks 
and deposited them in his personal bank account. (R. 43 0 % 20). 
That finding was supported by the evidence set forth above. 
Following these findings, at 1 24, the trial court 
entered its finding that Healey or his designated entities 
received distribution checks from Income Fund and other entities 
involved in the ventures and failed and refused to pay Prince's 
share. (R. 432 1 24). The court continued by finding that 
Healey exercised exclusive dominion and control over said funds 
which he deposited in his personal checking account. (R. 432 
11 24) . 
The distribution checks received by Healey for the 
Income Fund general partnership units fall squarely within that 
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finding of fact. Prince's rightful share of those distributions 
equalled $6,875. 
In addition, Healey received additional distributions 
from partnership businesses which he deposited into his personal 
banking account. Those distributions are dealt with also by the 
trial court in finding of fact no. 24. (R. 432 U 24). Again, 
reference to the record reveals an evidentiary basis for the 
court's f inding. 
On the afternoon of the second day of trial, Prince 
called Healey to the stand and began introducing a series of 
exhibits. Those exhibits contained copies of checks received 
from one or another of the parties' various joint businesses and 
deposited by Healey in his personal bank account at First 
Interstate Bank. Each exhibit corresponded to one month in 1989, 
1990 and 1991. (R. 947 L. 4-10). 
Initially, Healey's counsel objected when Prince asked 
to have the first of these exhibits admitted into evidence. (R. 
947 L. 13-14) . Following that objection, the trial court 
reserved ruling on the admissibility of the exhibits to allow 
Healey and his counsel an opportunity to examine them over the 
evening. (R. 948 L. 19-24; 955 L. 20-25; 956 L. 1-5). The court 
explained that Healey and his counsel would be given an 
opportunity to review the various exhibits and make a 
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determination as to whether or not Healey had signed the checks, 
etc., and if their authenticity was established then exhibit 
summaries rather than the exhibits themselves would be admitted 
into evidence. (R. 957 L. 11-25). 
The next morning at trial, Healey7s counsel explained 
that they had reviewed the exhibits and did not dispute that they 
represented accurate copies of checks received and deposited by 
Healey. (R. 978 L. 20-24). As Mr. England explained: 
But in specific response to the court's inquiry, those 
are in fact, or at least appear to be the actual 
records of that particular account, and whatever weight 
the court wants to give them, we don't have any 
objections. 
(R. 979 L. 9-13). 
Following addi t ional comments by counsel, the court 
received in to evidence Exhibits 69 and 70 through 82 which 
included the actual checks and bank statements as well as the 
three summaries. (R. 980 L. 9-13). Those summaries (Exhibits 
69, 81 and 82) set forth Healey's rece ip t and deposit of checks 
t o t a l l i n g $222,097.93 from the various par tnership businesses 
from 1989 through the f i r s t eight months of 1991. i 7 
- ' At page 19 of Appe l lan t ' s Brief, Healey argues tha t the record does not 
i nd i ca t e the exh ib i t which s e t s out the e ight month t o t a l s for 1991 and s t a t e s 
t h a t t he re was no evidence before the t r i a l court on t ha t i s s u e . Exhibit 82 
which was received in to evidence by the t r i a l court i s the summary for 1991. (R. 
980 L. 9-13). That summary t o t a l s $50,474.52. 
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Healey's counsel did lodge an objection to this 
evidence, which he now argues to this Court, that the checks 
actually received and deposited into Healey's account were not 
the best evidence of what monies Healey received from the 
partnership's businesses. 
That objection has no merit. In the first place the 
"best evidence" rule denotes only the requirement that the 
contents of an available written document be proven by 
introduction of the document itself. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 
640, 642 (Utah 1982). In the present case, Prince introduced 
copies of the actual checks that were deposited into Healey's 
account and copies of the account statements and deposit slips 
which evidenced conclusively Healey's receipt of those checks. 
In reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at 
trial, deference is given to the trial court's advantageous 
position. A trial court's ruling regarding admissibility will 
not be overturned unless it clearly appears that the lower court 
was in error. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 
920, 923 (Utah 1990). 
In the present case, Healey and his counsel were 
provided the opportunity of reviewing the exhibits before the 
trial court admitted them into evidence. Healey, through his 
counsel and through direct testimony, admitted that the checks 
s:\dwj\25369 3 4 
represented monies received by Healey from the various 
partnership businesses. 
Now Healey argues that it is the obligation of the 
moving party to present to the trier of fact the best evidence 
available. This statement does not accurately state the moving 
party's evidentiary burden. In every case there is a burden of 
production and a burden of persuasion. The burden of production 
is met if there is evidence from which a rational trier of fact 
could find that each element of the cause of action has been 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Whitchurch v. 
McBride, 818 P.2d 622, 624 (Wash. App. 1991). 
This burden of production is simply a corollary of the 
substantial evidence test. Substantial evidence is said to be 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion. See Johnson-Bowles v. Division 
of Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 107 (Utah App. 1992). 
Thus, to question the sufficiency of the evidence is to 
question whether the burden of production has been met. That 
burden is met when the moving party produces evidence on each 
element of his cause of action. Carle v. McChord Credit Union, 
827 P.2d 1070, 1075 (Wash. App. 1992). By reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court considers 
whether or not the moving party sustained its burden of 
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production. Once substantial evidence is found in the record, 
the job of the reviewing court is over. Silvis Through Silvis v. 
Hobbs, 824 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Mont. 1990). 
There is no legal requirement that a moving party must 
meet its burden of production with anything other than relevant, 
admissible evidence. In the present case, Healey has repeatedly 
confused the burden of production with the burden of persuasion 
and asked this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
trier of fact. 
Prince claimed in his Counterclaim that Healey had 
converted partnership property for his personal benefit. (R. 
138-139) . Said allegations of conversion must necessarily 
include the direct misappropriation of partnership monies. 
At the beginning of the case, Healey testified that he 
and Prince were fifty-fifty partners. (R. 617 L. 17-18). 
Repeatedly, Healey testified that whenever he received a 
distribution from the operation of the partnership, an equal and 
common amount was paid to Prince. (R. 1004 L. 18-23) . At trial, 
Prince showed that Healey, in fact, paid himself almost twice as 
much in partnership distributions than were received by Prince. 
In support of that claim, Prince introduced copies of 
the checks received and deposited by Healey from the various 
partnership businesses which totalled $222,097.93 for the period 
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of time from 1989 through the first eight months of 1991. As 
further evidence in support of his conversion claim, Prince 
introduced into evidence his receipts from partnership entities 
for that same period of time. Proper foundation was presented 
for the introduction of that evidence and it was received by the 
court. (R. 1051-1054). Those distributions totalled 
$105,106.21. 
At that point in the proceeding Prince had introduced 
admissible, credible evidence in support of the elements of his 
claim of conversion or misappropriation. He had established that 
Healey was in charge of the day-to-day operations and all 
accounting functions of the partnership businesses. (R. 103 L. 
13-16; 766 L. 18-24; 945 L. 18-20). He had established that 
Healey received distributions from the various partnership 
ventures which were deposited into his personal banking account 
at First Interstate Bank. (R. 757 L. 21-25; 758 L. 18; 946 L. 
17-19). 
Prince fulfilled his duty of production and introduced 
sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could 
find that Healey had paid himself more than his partner, and 
therefore converted partnership property. At the same time, 
Prince had fulfilled his burden of presenting substantial 
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evidence. As this Court explained in Johnson-Bowles, supra, 829 
P.2d at 107: 
Substantial evidence is something less than the weight 
of the evidence, but more than a more scintilla of 
evidence. 
Upon the introduction of that evidence, the burden of 
persuasion or the burden of going forward shifted to Healey to 
prove his claim that the significant difference between what he 
received and what Prince received did not represent conversion of 
partnership property. 
The general law of evidence provides that a party who 
asserts a fact has the burden of establishing that fact. See 
Troutman v. Valley Nat. Bank of Arizona, 826 P.2d 810, 814 (Ariz. 
App. 1992). Therefore, while the burden of proof never shifts, 
the burden of going forward with evidence may shift. Id. at 814. 
In the present case, Healey attempted to persuade the 
trial court that he had not misappropriated partnership monies 
through his own testimony. Following the introduction of that 
evidence it was left to the trier of fact, which in this case was 
the trial court, to weigh the evidence presented by both parties 
and determine who had carried the burden of persuasion. 
It is obvious from the trial court's decision that it 
did not find Healey's testimony to be credible and therefore 
granted judgment in favor of Prince on this and almost every 
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other issue. The fact of the matter is that Healey's testimony 
was not believable. A good example of that fact is his testimony 
regarding the 1991 distributions. In defense of the wide 
discrepancy between what Healey received and what Prince 
received, Healey testified that the difference was a result of 
reimbursement of expenses, reimbursement of lease payments, some 
small accounting fees and an intermittent salary. (R. 1005, L. 
1-3; 1010 L. 10-13; 1011 L. 9-17). 
However, Healey testified that in 1991 the various 
lease payments had dropped off and further testified that he took 
no salary for the eight month period in question. (R. 1013 L. 2-
12). In the absence of what he previously claimed were 
additional distributions, Healey received $50,474.52 from the 
partnership business in 1991. (R. 1013 L. 13-17). Prince 
received less than half that amount or $20,680.55 in the same 
period of time. (R. 1054 L. 14-20). 
When that evidence and all other reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to 
the present judgment, clear support exists for the trial court's 
findings of fact. 
Healey failed to carry the burden of persuading the 
trial court that he had not converted partnership monies for his 
own personal use and benefit. He now asks this Court to retry 
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that issue and substitute its judgment for that of the trier of 
fact. That is not the role of the appellate court. Healey's 
failure to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings or persuade the trier of fact of the merit of his 
position must result in the affirmation of that portion of the 
j udgment. -7 
Healey's argument in Point Three is based on the same 
misunderstanding as found in his Fourth Argument. Once again, 
Prince presented evidence, both documentary and through the 
testimony of Healey, that Healey received $362,302.44 of 
partnership monies and assumed control over those funds by 
depositing those monies into his personal bank account. 
At page 961 of the record, counsel for Prince begins 
introducing the various checks that the partnership received from 
an investor group designated as the Bagleys. As to each check, 
Healey testified that he endorsed the instrument and deposited it 
-
/
 Healey repeatedly states that no evidence exists that can be marshalled in 
support of the trial court's findings. His confusion appears to be based on the 
idea that said evidence must come from the testimony of witnesses called by 
Prince. For example, at the end of Point Four, Healey states: "Even, after an 
attempt to marshal the testimony of those witnesses called by Prince, no 
misappropriation of funds was ever inferred let alone testified to by those 
witnesses." Marshalling requires an appellant to present all evidence in favor 
of the facts as found by the trial court. See Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 
199 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). Similarly, when determining if a party has met 
its burden of production which as explained above is analogous to the sufficiency 
of the evidence, all evidence is to be considered, regardless of the party who 
introduced it. See Whitchurch v. McBride, 818 P. 2d 622, 624 (Wash. App. 1991) . 
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into his personal checking account at First Interstate Bank. (R. 
961-963) . 
However, at the time Healey was deposed in this case, 
he testified that he deposited the Bagley monies into a business 
account that he maintained for the joint venture. (R, 96 9 L. 11-
13; R. 1308) A' 
At the last day of the trial, Healey's testimony 
concerning the Bagley monies continued. During that testimony, 
Healey acknowledged that Exhibits 84, 85, 86 and 87 represented 
monies that he received in relation to the Bagley transaction 
which was partnership property. (R. 981 L. 24-25; 982 L. 1-5). 
Additionally, Healey admitted depositing this partnership 
property into his personal account rather than one of the 
numerous partnership accounts maintained by the parties. (R. 972 
L. 17-25; 973 L. 1-10). That testimony and the exhibits 
introduced by Prince established Prince's prima facia case of 
conversion of this partnership property. 
In Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958) the 
Utah Supreme Court set forth the standards for a conversion of 
personal property claim. This Court referred to those standards 
-
/
 When questioned about this discrepancy, Healey testified that at the 
deposition he did not understand the full content of the question or what the 
check referred to. (R. 969 L. 14-20). Further review of the deposition 
testimony contradicted Healey s claim of a prior misunderstanding. (R. 969 L. 
21-25; 970 L. 1-11). 
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in State v. Twitchell 832 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1992) and 
recognized that money may be the subject of conversion. Id. at 
870. 
The Allred v. Hinkley standard for the tort of 
conversion is: 
A conversion is an act of wilful interference with a 
chattel, done without lawful justification by which a 
person entitled thereto is denied of its use and 
possession: the measure of damages of conversion is 
the full value of the property converted. . . Although 
conversion results only from intentional conduct, it 
does not, however, require a conscious wrongdoing, but 
only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the 
goods inconsistent with the owner's rights. 
(Quoted from State v. Twitchell, supra, 932 P.2d at 870). 
In Twitchell, this Court held that the defendant 
committed conversion when he retained his victim's premium 
payments, presumably in a personal or corporate account under his 
direct control, rather than the trust account required by 
statute. Id. at 870. 
Similarly in Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 
P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
plaintiff's conduct in holding checks issued to himself and 
defendant constituted conversion of the checks which entitled the 
defendant in that case to recover the amount of the property 
converted. Id. at 179. 
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In the present case, the testimony of Healey 
established sufficient evidence of conversion of the Bagley 
monies to support the trial court's finding on that issue. The 
measure of damages for conversion of personal property is the 
full value of the property converted. By Healey's own testimony, 
Prince had a right to one-half of the money received from the 
Bagleys. One-half of that amount is $181,191.22 which is the 
amount awarded to Prince under the trial court's conclusion of 
law no. 11. (R. 438 U 11). 
Substantial evidence exists in the record that supports 
the trial court's determination that Healey converted Prince's 
interest in monies received by the partnership or distributed 
from the partnership ventures and those findings and the 
conclusions of law related thereto should be upheld on appeal. 
SIXTH ARGUMENT 
HEALEY'S FAILURE TO PRESENT ANY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ON THE 
VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP AND HIS MATERIAL BREACH OF THE 
MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT FORECLOSES ANY RECOVERY BY HEALEY IN 
THE PRESENT CASE 
In his final argument, Healey asks this Court to 
reinstate the indemnification provisions of the Memorandum 
Agreement. As set out in detail above, the trial court's 
decision to deny Healey's request for specific performance of the 
Memorandum Agreement and the dismissal of that Cause of Action 
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was supported by substantial evidence and correctly followed the 
applicable legal standard. 
At the trial of this matter, Healey relied exclusively 
upon his right to specifically enforce the Memorandum Agreement. 
Healey presented no credible evidence on the value of the 
partnership at the time of the dissolution. Based on this lack 
of credible evidence, the trial court entered finding of fact no. 
36 and conclusion of law no. 18. (R. 435 % 36, 439 H 18). 
Healey has not challenged that finding or the corresponding 
conclusion of law. 
Therefore, there exists no basis in the record to 
support Healey's claim that the trial court's decision denied 
Healey his portion of the fair distribution of the partnership 
assets. 
The evidence presented at trial established that Prince 
had made payments, releases and conveyances to Healey exceeding 
$450,000 in value. (R. 701, L. 7-10; 884 L. 5-8, 17-20; 885 L. 
8-16). And, there was testimony by Karen English who took over 
the accounting function for the partnership businesses that she 
had personally reviewed the historic accounting records created 
by Healey and based on that record there was no way to determine 
the actual financial condition of the various partnership 
entities. (R. 1077 L. 9-14). 
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One thing that could be ascertained from those records 
was the enormous amount of debt that those entities had accrued, 
Karen English testified that the total debt was more than two 
million dollars. (R. 1077 L. 4-5). 
In the summer of 1991, Healey approached Prince with a 
demand that they disassociate and dissolve their partnership. At 
that time Healey had been in charge of the day-to-day operations 
of 17 or 18 restaurants and was in charge of all accounting for 
those restaurants. As Healey testified, he spent more than 
seventy-five percent of his time on partnership business. 
Obviously, Healey had far superior knowledge of the 
true condition of the partnership business when he asked for 
dissolution of the partnership. Following a three-day trial, the 
court found that Healey withheld partnership property from Prince 
when he did not convey the Income Fund interest. The trial court 
found further that Healey breached fiduciary duties he owed to 
Prince by not making a full and honest disclosure of his receipt 
of partnership property. Finally, the trial court found that the 
financial information provided to Prince by Healey prior to the 
time of the parties' negotiations was incomplete, inaccurate and 
misleading and gave a misleading impression of the true financial 
condition of the parties' businesses. (R. 435 % 35). 
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This later finding is supported by the very credible 
testimony of Karen English and has not been challenged by Healey 
on appeal. 
At the time the parties negotiated the Memorandum 
Agreement, Healey had far more knowledge than Prince concerning 
the parties' business. Rather than fulfill his fiduciary duties 
to his partner, Healey failed to share this knowledge with 
Prince, failed to inform Prince of the true condition of the 
businesses, failed to inform Prince that he intended to keep the 
very valuable Income Fund interests and failed to inform Prince 
that he had been taking twice as much money out of their 
businesses than he had been distributing to Prince. 
Taking into consideration the relative negotiating 
positions of the parties, the uncertainty concerning the true 
value of the partnership business and Healey's clear breach of 
both the Memorandum Agreement and his fiduciary duties to Prince, 
the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that specific 
performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to the sense 
of justice and good conscious of the court, and accordingly, 
considerable latitude of discretion is allowed in the trial 
court's determination as to whether it should be entered and what 
s:\dwj\25369 46 
judgment should be entered in respect thereto. Morris v. Sykes, 
624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981). 
In the present case, the equities and law clearly 
preponderate on Prince's side and provide a more than adequate 
basis for the trial court's decision. Once again, in his last 
argument Healey resurrects his claim that the Memorandum 
Agreement should be specifically enforced with adjustments made 
to offset his violations of legal and equitable duties owed to 
Prince. Before a party can obtain equitable relief in the form 
of specific performance, he must have performed his side of the 
bargain both in terms of the express covenants of the agreement 
and the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. In 
this case, Healey did neither and therefore lost any and all 
right to the specific performance of the Memorandum Agreement. 
When that Cause of Action was dismissed by the court, 
Healey's right to any recovery against Prince had to be based on 
the other Causes of Action presented in his Complaint. One such 
cause was unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. Specifically, in 
his Second Claim for Relief, Healey stated that he expected to be 
fully compensated for the reasonable value of his share of the 
partnership ventures and claimed that Prince would be unjustly 
enriched if he retained the benefit of the property conveyed to 
him without compensating Healey. (R. 24). 
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Yet at trial, Healey presented no credible evidence in 
support of that claim which was dismissed ultimately by the 
court. That portion of the court's judgment has not been 
challenged on appeal and is not subject to reversal or 
modification. 
It was Healey's absolute lack of proof rather than an 
abuse of discretion or mistake of law that eliminated Healey's 
alleged claim to additional payment from Prince for the value of 
the partnership assets in question. That defect in Healey's case 
should not be overlooked by this Court. 
Healey had every opportunity to present credible 
evidence as to the value of the parties' assets to support his 
unjust enrichment claim. That claim was plead by Healey in the 
alternative to cover the exact situation in which he now finds 
himself, to wit, unable to prevail on his specific performance 
claim. The failure to present credible evidence in support of 
that alternative basis for relief precludes Healey from 
recovering anything and precludes any modification of the trial 
court's findings and conclusions and the judgment below. 
CONCLUSION 
When the record is viewed as a whole and the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings of fact marshalled and 
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, 
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substantial evidence exists in support of each and every finding 
of the trial court. Healey has failed to marshal that evidence 
and has failed to establish that the court applied an incorrect 
legal standard to those facts. 
Rather, Healey asks this Court to retry the case and 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. That is not 
the appropriate function for this Court on appeal. 
The trial court's findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence and that court correctly applied those 
factual findings in determining the legal and equitable issues. 
This Court should not disturb those findings or conclusions, but 
should affirm the trial court's judgment in its entirety. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 1993. 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendant Appellee John 
Prince 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY \ \ 




JOHN B. PRINCE, 
Defendant. 





This matter came on for trial before the above-entitled 
Court on March 22, 23 and 24. Plaintiff, Fred Healey ("Healey") 
was represented by Les England and defendant and counterclaimant, 
John B. Prince ("Prince"), was represented by Daniel W. Jackson. 
After hearing the presentation of evidence in open court, 
reviewing the exhibits received, reviewing the file in this 
matter, and after due deliberation, and good cause appearing 
therefor, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
No. 920902344CN 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Judge Dennis Frederick 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about October 1979, Prince and Healey formed 
a partnership for the purpose of owning and operating restaurants 
and associated entities. The parties referred to their 
partnership as Prince/Healey Ventures (hereinafter "Ventures"). 
2. The parties' oral partnership agreement provided 
that Healey would supervise the day-to-day operations of the 
Ventures and provide management and accounting services to the 
various enterprises on a cost-only or non-profit basis. The 
agreement further provided that profits from the operations of 
the Ventures were to be distributed equally between Prince and 
Healey. 
3. The Healey Company, a company owned solely by 
Healey, began performing bookkeeping and accounting services for 
the Ventures shortly after the creation of the partnership. 
Healey and Prince agreed that The Healey Company would perform 
said services without either partner deriving a profit from its 
operations. The name of The Healey Company was changed in 1990 
to Food Management Systems, Inc. and the company was 
incorporated. It continued to perform accounting services for 
the Ventures until August, 1991. 
4. By letter dated July 8, 1991, Healey gave notice to 
Prince that he wished to terminate their partnership 
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relationship. At a meeting on July 14, 1991, Healey offered to 
sell to Prince his interests in all entities and assets 
associated with and related to the Ventures. By letter dated 
August 15, 1991, Prince accepted Healey's offer. 
5. The purchase and sale of Healey7s interests and 
assets was memorialized in a Memorandum Agreement, Exhibit 3, 
dated as of August 15, 1991 (the "Memorandum Agreement"). It 
provided in pertinent part, as follows: 
R. Fred Healey ("Healey") and John B. Prince 
("Prince") hereby agree to separate all of 
their joint business interests, by Prince 
buying out Healey's total interest (except as 
noted below) in the assets, properties and 
interests which evidence or otherwise relate 
in any way to their joint business 
activities. 
6. Under the terms of the Memorandum Agreement, Healey 
was obligated to: 
(a) Assign or otherwise convey to Prince any 
and all interests owned or held by Healey 
(either individually or through Healey-owned 
entities) in all enterprises in which Healey 
and Prince held joint or common interests or 
which related in any way to their common 
business activities. . . . 
(b) Deliver the accounting records and 
accounting contracts for all Ventures to 
Prince; 
(c) Convey to Prince all real property 
associated with or related to the Ventures, 
including quit claim deeds for the properties 




(d) Convey to Prince all personal property associated 
with or related to the Ventures; and 
(e) Disassociate himself from all business 
activities related in any way to the 
Ventures, except as Healey was separately 
retained as a consultant under the Memorandum 
Agreement. 
7. In consideration of his purchase of all of Healey's 
interests and assets and pursuant to the Memorandum Agreement, 
Prince made payments, releases or conveyances exceeding $450,000. 
In addition, Prince paid common debts listed on Exhibit "A" to 
the Memorandum Agreement of more than $225,000. 
8. The Memorandum Agreement was a purchase agreement 
and did not contain any waiver of claims. It did not provide for 
the issuance of a promissory note by Prince or contain any 
provision for acceleration of Prince's installment payments to 
Healey. It did not include an attorneys fees provision. 
9. On September 30, 1991 Healey made a conditional 
delivery to Prince of quit claim deeds for the three real 
properties he was required to convey under the Memorandum 
Agreement. Healey did not tender an unconditional delivery of 
those deeds until December, 1992. 
10. Notwithstanding Prince's demands, in December 
1991, Healey informed Prince that he would not transfer any 
limited or general partnership interests or assets involving or 
relating to Income Fund, Ltd. ("Income Fund" ), an entity which 
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was part of the Ventures, to Prince. Healey further refused to 
deliver the accounting records and accounting contract relating 
to Income Fund or the control of Income Fund to Prince. Further, 
Healey refused to disassociate himself from the operations of 
Income Fund. 
11. Because of Healey's refusal to convey the various 
interests in Income Fund and unconditionally deliver the quit 
claim deeds as required by the Memorandum Agreement, Healey was 
in breach of the Memorandum Agreement. Prince gave notice to 
Healey of his intention to stop performance thereunder, and 
ceased making payments to Healey after payment of the November 
and December, 1991 installments. 
12. On April 22, 1991, Healey filed his complaint in 
the present action wherein he sought specific performance of the 
Memorandum Agreement. Neither at the time of nor prior to filing 
his complaint, did Healey make any tender of any interests or 
assets involving Income Fund or make an unconditional tender of 
the quit claim deeds. Healey has continued to refuse tender of 
the Income Fund interests since filing this litigation. 
13. Over one and one-half (1M) years after filing his 
complaint (on or about December 22, 1992), Healey delivered the 
quit claim deeds in question to Prince. 
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14. Income Fund was organized by Prince and Healey for 
the purpose of buying certain restaurant equipment from The Roy 
Ponderosa (Steak V) and leasing the equipment back to that 
restaurant. Both Prince and Healey acted as joint guarantors of 
the lease obligation between Income Fund and Steak V. Each of 
Prince and Healey received the benefit of one-half of the 
proceeds of the sale of the equipment to the limited partnership 
through the payment of debts of the Ventures. 
15. The only business of Income Fund was the leasing 
of said equipment to Steak V. Its only asset was the equipment 
located at the restaurant. All monies obtained by Income Fund 
were derived directly from the operation of Steak V. 
16. The Healey Company entered into an agreement with 
Income Fund to provide accounting services to the limited 
partnership for a monthly fee of $300. The Healey Company aka 
Food Management Services, Inc. had similar contracts or 
agreements with the other Ventures. 
17. The owners of partnership units in Income Fund 
received quarterly distributions from the partnership equalling 
an annual return of ten percent (10%) on their capital 
investment. Said distributions were paid each quarter from 
December, 1988 through September, 1991. 
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18. At the time the Memorandum Agreement was executed, 
Healey and Prince each owned 71 limited partnership units in 
Income Fund. In addition, 50 general partnership units were held 
in the names of Healey and Income Leasing, Inc., a Utah 
corporation wholly owned by Healey ("Income Leasing"). The sole 
business of Income Leasing was to act as general partner of 
Income Fund. 
19. The general partnership units held in the name of 
Healey and Income Leasing were issued in consideration for the 
transfer of an unspecific, undesignated portion of restaurant 
equipment owned equally by Prince and Healey as part of the 
Ventures. 
20. Healey received quarterly distribution checks from 
Income Fund for the 71 limited partnership units he held 
individually. Those distribution checks were endorsed by Healey 
and deposited into an account he held jointly with his wife at 
First Interstate Bank. This account was separate and distinct 
from the Healey's household account maintained at First Security 
Bank. In addition, Healey received quarterly distributions in 
his name and the name of Income Leasing for the general 
partnership units in Income Fund. He also received quarterly 
payments of the accounting fee through checks made out to the 
order of The Healey Company. The checks for the general 
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partnership distributions and the accounting contract were also 
deposited in Healey's First Interstate Bank account. In total, 
Healey received annual distributions of $15,600.00 from Income 
Fund. Under the terms of the Memorandum Agreement Healey was to 
receive monthly installment payments from Prince in the principal 
amount of $21,24 9.96 per annum. 
21. All of Healey's limited partnership's interest in 
Income Fund, the general partnership interest in Income Fund held 
in the names of Healey and Income Leasing, and Income Fund's 
interest in the accounting contract constitute interests and 
assets governed by the Memorandum Agreement. Healey was required 
to convey those interests and assets to Prince pursuant to the 
clear and unambiguous language of the Memorandum Agreement. 
22. In January, 1989, Healey received One Hundred and 
Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($175,000) which funds were 
property of the partnership, and deposited those funds into 
Healey's First Interstate Bank account. Thereafter, Healey 
deposited an additional One Hundred and Eighty-Seven Thousand 
Three Hundred and Two Dollars and Forty-Four Cents ($187,302.44) 
of partnership funds into that checking account. The funds were 
used by Healey for his own personal purposes. Prince did not 
receive his one-half share of said funds. 
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23. During the term of the Prince Healey partnership, 
Healey issued and signed checks written on partnership accounts 
to himself and Prince. Throughout their association, Healey 
represented to Prince that all such distributions to the partners 
were made equally and uniformly as their agreement required. 
24. Healey or his designated entities received 
distribution checks from Income Fund and other entities involved 
in the Ventures and failed and refused to pay Prince's share. 
From January, 1989 through August, 1991, Healey received 
$117,073.50 more funds from the Ventures than were paid to 
Prince. Healey exercised exclusive dominion and control over 
said funds which he deposited and held in his personal checking 
account at First Interstate Bank. 
25. For a brief period in 1990, Prince and Healey 
agreed that Healey would take a salary from the partnership. 
Healey rescinded that agreement and returned one-half of the 
salary for a three-month period to Prince. No other agreement 
was ever reached by the partners that entitled Healey to receive 
a salary. 
26. Healey agreed with Prince that he would not profit 
from the operations of The Healey Company. Contrary to that 
agreement, Healey diverted funds belonging to The Healey Company 
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to his personal use and benefit and thereby derived a profit from 
the operation of The Healey Company. 
27. While in control over and supervision of the 
accounting and financial affairs of the Ventures, Healey caused 
funds of the associated entities to be commingled in an account 
entitled Ponderosa Combined Account. Additionally, Healey caused 
intracompany loans to be made between the associated entities. 
28. As a result of the commingling of funds and the 
intracompany loans, Prince has been unable to reconcile the books 
and records of the associated entities. 
29. Prior to the execution of the Memorandum 
Agreement, Healey determined that he would withhold all the 
various Income Fund interests and assets from Prince. At no time 
prior to the execution of the Memorandum Agreement did Healey 
inform Prince of his intention to withhold said interests and 
assets nor prior to the execution of the Memorandum Agreement did 
Healey inform Prince that those interests and assets would not be 
conveyed to Prince. 
30. Healey had an affirmative duty to disclose his 
intention to retain the various interests in Income Fund and 
Income Leasing and related assets to Prince prior to the 
execution of the Memorandum Agreement. Healey failed to fulfill 
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that duty and thereby breached the fiduciary duty he owed to 
Prince. 
31. Healey's intentional non-disclosure of his desire 
to retain the interests and assets relating to Income Fund was 
done in bad faith for the purpose of depriving Prince of a 
valuable portion of the parties' joint business activities. 
32. Healey's retention of the interests and assets 
held by him in Income Fund would deprive Prince of a significant 
portion of what he bargained for and agreed to purchase from 
Healey pursuant to the terms of the Memorandum Agreement and 
would result in Healey being unjustly enriched. 
33. At all times, Healey represented to Prince that 
the partners had received equal distributions from the operations 
of the Ventures. Healey failed to disclose to Prince, at the 
time of his offer to sell or prior to the execution of the 
Memorandum Agreement, that Healey had deposited into his personal 
account large sums of money in excess of the distributions 
received by Prince. Said omissions when viewed in light of the 
circumstances and prior statements made by Healey were 
misleading. 
34. At the time the parties were negotiating the terms 
of the Memorandum Agreement, Healey, as managing partner, had 
control over and possession of all the books and records of the 
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partnership and related entities and possessed far greater 
knowledge than Prince concerning the financial affairs of the 
Ventures. 
35. The financial information provided to Prince by 
Healey prior to the time the parties negotiated the terms of the 
Memorandum Agreement was incomplete, inaccurate and misstated or 
gave a misleading impression of the true financial condition of 
the partnership and related entities. 
36. Healey failed to present any credible evidence at 
trial in support of his claims for quantum meruit, estoppel, 
appointment of a receiver, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
conversion or partition of assets. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court 
concludes as follows: 
1. The Memorandum Agreement is clear and unambiguous 
and can be interpreted and enforced by the court without resort 
to extrinsic, parol evidence. 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the Memorandum Agreement, 
the parties intended to completely disassociate themselves and 
terminate their partnership relationship. 
3. Pursuant to the Memorandum Agreement, the parties 
intended for Prince to purchase and Healey to convey and assign 
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any and all interests, assets or property owned or held by Healey 
(either individually or through Healey-owned entities) in all 
enterprises in which the parties held joint or common interests. 
4. Through the Memorandum Agreement, the parties 
intended for Prince to purchase and Healey to convey and assign 
any and all interests, assets or property owned or held by Healey 
(either individually or through Healey-owned entities) which 
related in any way to their joint business activities. 
5. Prince and Healey owned and held joint interests in 
Income Fund. Income Fund's business relates exclusively to the 
parties' joint business activities. Income Leasing's sole 
business was to act as a general partner of Income Fund, which 
business was exclusively related to the parties' joint business 
activities. 
6. Income Fund was governed by and fell within the 
broad language of the Memorandum Agreement. Healey's interest in 
Income Fund, the general partnership interests therein and the 
accounting contract between Income Fund and The Healey Company 
were purchased by Prince under the Memorandum Agreement. 
7. Under the terms of the Memorandum Agreement, Healey 
was required to convey his 71 limited partnership units and all 
the general partnership units in Income Fund held in the names of 
Healey and Income Leasing to Prince. In addition, Healey was 
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required to transfer the accounting contract, accounting records 
and control over Income Fund to Prince and otherwise disassociate 
himself from all businesses related in any way to the operation 
of the parties' restaurants, except as separately retained as a 
consultant under the terms of the Memorandum Agreement. 
8. Notwithstanding Prince's request for the 
conveyance of said interests, assets and control regarding Income 
Fund, Healey refused to convey, transfer or deliver said property 
to Prince. At no time has Healey tendered the conveyance or 
transfer of those interests, assets and control to Prince. 
9. Through the present action, Healey seeks specific 
performance of the Memorandum Agreement. A party who desires to 
use legal process to enforce a contract by specific performance 
must perform his obligations under the contract or make a 
complete and unconditional tender of performance in order to put 
the other party in default. 
10. The general partnership interests in Income Fund 
constitute property belonging to the Ventures. Prince is 
entitled to receive one-half of any and all distributions 
received by Healey which were in excess of distributions received 
by Prince. From January, 1989 through August, 1991, those excess 
distributions total $117,073.50. Prince is awarded judgment 
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against Healey for one-half of said funds in the amount of 
$58,536.75. 
11. In January, 1989, Healey received $175,000 and 
thereafter $187,3 02.44 which were partnership funds and deposited 
said funds into his personal account at First Interstate Bank. 
Prince is awarded judgment against Healey for $181,151.22 which 
is his one-half share of said funds. 
12. As partners, Prince and Healey occupied a 
fiduciary relationship toward each other which required that they 
deal with each other in the utmost good faith. As the partner 
who maintained the books and records of the partnership and 
supervised its daily operations, Healey's duty to act in good 
faith and as a fiduciary toward Prince was heightened. 
13. Healey breached the fiduciary duty he owed to 
Prince in at least the following ways: 
(a) Healey provided Prince with incomplete and 
inaccurate information concerning the financial 
condition of the parties' businesses, 
(b) Healey received distributions from the Ventures of 
cash and other partnership property in excess of the 
distributions received by Prince, and 
(c) Healey willfully and consciously withheld from 
Prince his intention to retain the various interest in 
Income Fund and not convey those interests to Prince as 
part of the Memorandum Agreement. 
14. Healey's intentional non-disclosure of his 
decision to retain the interests and assets relating to Income 
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Fund evidenced his bad faith and his intent to deprive Prince of 
a valuable portion of the parties' joint business activities. 
15. Healey's retention of the interests and assets 
held by him in Income Fund would deprive Prince of a significant 
portion of what he bargained for and agreed to purchase from 
Healey pursuant to the terms of the Memorandum Agreement and 
would result in Healey being unjustly enriched. 
16. Healey's actions in failing to disclose his intent 
to retain the interests and assets associated with Income Fund 
and his other omissions and misstatements and his several 
breaches of the fiduciary duty owed to Prince constitute bad 
faith and unclean hands and provide another basis for this 
court's denial of Healey's request for specific performance and 
the dismissal of that claim. 
17. This Court is persuaded as of the date of the 
trial that the accounting records have been conveyed and provided 
to Prince and Prince's request for a further accounting is 
denied. 
18. At the trial in this matter, Healey failed to 
present any credible evidence in support of his claims for 
quantum meruit, estoppel, appointment of a receiver, breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion or partition of assets and 
those causes are dismissed. 
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19. Healey's refusal to convey the interests, assets 
and control of Income Fund and failure to fully disclose Healey's 
financial self-dealing constitutes a material breach of the 
Memorandum Agreement. 
20. As a result of his breach of the Memorandum 
Agreement and failure to tender the agreed upon performance prior 
to the initiation of this action, Healey is not entitled to 
specific performance of the Memorandum Agreement and his claim or 
cause of action for specific performance is dismissed. 
21. Healey is ordered to convey to Prince forthwith 
any and all interest he or his related entities have in Income 
Fund. 
22. In light of Healey's substantial and material 
breach of the Memorandum Agreement, as well as his commingling 
and diverting of partnership assets, Prince is relieved from any 
further obligations for payment pursuant to the terms thereof. 
DATED this htL^ay of May, 1993. tj day 





This Memorandum Agreement memorializes the agreement reached between the 
parties on 15 August, 1991. 
R. FRED HEALEY ("Healey") and JOHN B. PRINCE ("Prince") hereby agree 
to separate all of their joint business interests, by Prince buying out Healey's total interest 
(except as noted below) in the assets, properties and interests which evidence or otherwise relate 
in any way to their joint business activities. Said purchase to be made according to the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. Prince shall pay Healey Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars ($700,000.00) 
for the purchase by Prince of Healey's interests in all the businesses in which Healey and Prince 
have any joint interests (other than the Alamo Storage property and Swiss Colony) and all assets 
and properties, real and personal, used in the operation of those businesses. 
2. The $700,000.00 purchase price shall be paid as follows: 
(a) $150,000.00 cash down payment (of which $100,000.00 has already 
been paid). 
(b) Prince shall convey to Healey all of Prince's right, title and interest 
in the Alamo Storage property, and Prince shall receive a $125,000.00 credit against the 
$700,000.00 purchase price for such conveyance. Healey shall assume and agree to pay the 
mortgages on the Alamo Storage property and indemnify Prince from all liabilities associated 
with that property. 
(c) The balance of the purchase price ($425,000.00) shall be payable 
in 240 equal monthly payments (including principal and interest at the annual rate of 9.5% per 
annum), commencing November 1, 1991. 
yi) As security for the deferred payments Prince shall: 
pledge all of the shares in Square Meal, Inc., BB 
Barbecue, Inc. and the Broiler, Inc.; 
grant a security interest to Healey (by a security 
agreement and financing statement) in all of the furniture, fixtures and equipment in the 
Ponderosa restaurants known as Steak V, VI, VII, Vm and DC if such grant does not result in 
a breach or default of any loan agreements with any financial institutions which holds a security 
interest in such property or if the applicable financial institutions(s) consents to such grant or 
waives such breach; and 
grant a lien to Healey (by trust deeds) on the real 
property utilized by Steak VII, Steak Vm and Steak IX if such grant does not result in a breach 
or default of any loan agreements with any financial institutions which holds a lien or other 
similar security interest in such property or if the applicable financial institution(s) consents to 
such grant or waives such breach. 
(d) In addition to the payment of $700,000.00, Prince shall release 
Healey from his obligation to pay Prince $125,000 as part of the $250,000.00 prior loan for 
Diego's. 
(e) In addition to the payment of the $700,000 as set forth above, 
Prince shall fully and totally indemnify Healey against all debts and obligations for which Prince 
and Healey are jointly liable (other than those associated with or resulting from the operations 
of the Alamo Storage property and Swiss Colony) and which are set forth on the schedule 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof. Additionally, Prince 
shall fully and totally indemnify Healey for those debts and obligations which are set forth on 
the schedule attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and by this reference made a part hereof. 
(f) Prince shall use his reasonable efforts to cause Diego's to make 
payments on an obligation of Diego's to the financial institution that financed the satellite system 
in the approximate amount of $2,200. The parties hereby agree that this paragraph 2(f) is not 
2 
a personal obligation of Prince to Healey. Healey waives any and all claims against Prince for 
the payment by Prince of all or any portion of this obligation or for contribution. If Diego's 
fails to pay such amount and Healey pays the obligation pursuant to his personal guarantee. 
Prince shall use his reasonable efforts to cause Diego's to deliver possession of the satellite 
system to Healey. 
(g) The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that Diego's currently 
owes Sysco Food Service ("Sysco") approximately $34,000 and that such amount is secured by 
certain assets of Diego's and the personal guarantee of Healey. If Diego's is unable to pay this 
amount to Sysco, and the value of the collateral does not satisfy the obligation in full, then 
Prince agrees to pay to Healey one half of any amounts which Healey pays to Sysco in 
satisfaction of his personal guaranty of such obligation. Prince agrees that the collateral or 
conforming equivalent collateral will remain on the premises at Diego's. 
3. Swiss Colony shall continue under the present 50/50 ownership. 
4. Healey agrees to not compete with Prince in the restaurant/catering 
business for a period of five (5) years within a 3-mile radius around any existing 
restaurants/catering business owned or controlled by Prince and Healey immediately prior to 
August 15, 1991. Prince agrees to pay Healey an additional $50,000.00 no later than October 
1, 1991 as consideration for Healey's agreement not to compete. As part of the non-competition 
agreement, Healey also agrees to not hire away any employees from any of the operations 
previously owned or controlled by Prince and Healey, and to not induce any employees to leave 
such employment. In this regard, Healey shall be free to hire such employees after a period of 
3 
at least six months has passed after they have terminated their employment with Prince or his 
businesses. 
5. Healey agrees to consult with Prince and/or the entities controlled by 
Prince for up to 5 years for payment of $50.00 per hour. Prince has tendered $1000.00 as a 
deposit toward the consulting service. 
The parties intend that this shall be a binding agreement between the two of them, 
but also agree that more definitive, detailed documents consistent with this Memorandum 
Agreement, shall be prepared and reviewed by their respective legal counsel to replace and 
supersede this agreement, which will more ftilly evidence the agreement between the parties and 
which the parties agree to use best efforts to prepare and execute on or before October 15, 
1991. 
The agreement is binding upon and inures to the benefit of the parties and their 
respective heirs, successors and assigns. The parties agree that these rights and duties under this 
agreement cannot be assigned without the express written consent of the other which consent 
shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
7 
Z ' ^ j o h n B. Prince 





lease: Cakwood Village; Year 2000 $5,534.92/Month plus CAM 
Zions: Cash Register Lease Less than $400 per month 
Limited Partners: Preferential 10% Return before a return to John or MP 
Steak Tv/o 
Iiease: Hermes; Year 2001 with renewal options, $5,150 plus CW1 
Limited Partners: Preferential 15% Iteturn before a return to Jolin or Ke 
Zions: Cash P^gister Ijease less than $400 per month 
Steak Three 
Lease: 2100 Associates; Year 1992 with renewal options, $4,500/month 
Gerry Nibley: $150 per quarter 
Ann Aljrond: $675 per quarter 
Limited Partners: 15% Preferential 
Steak Four 
lease: University Mall; Year 2003 with options, $$4,465.82/Month 
Zions: Cash Register Lease $307.50/Konthly 
Limited Partners: Preferential return of 10% on $95,000 
Steak Five 
lease: Roy Marketplace Plaza; Year 2005 with options, $6772.67 Month]y 
Income Fund Limited: Monthly Equipment Lease $3,500 g 
Zions: dsh Register Lease less than $400 per month (f^^/^v ftSV f*\ / ^ r , 
Steak Six 
Lease: Equity Properites; Year 2026; $7,425 monthly plus CAM 
Lease: Tricon Leasing; Equipment Lease $5,550 approx, June 1992 
Steak Seven 
Lease: Healey Prince; Year 2007; $13,033,33 per month 
Note: Trimble Healey; Interest only 1992; then Anort. $200?: 
Steak Eight ' ^xj 
Loan: SRA $3,705.34 per month automatic v/ithdrawl/20 years 
Loan: Zions $4,900 per month 15 year Amort. 
Loan: FSB Equipment approximately $8,500 per month 60 Ttos. 
Steak Nine 
loan: First Security Bank; $6,100 per month Equipment 3 years 
Loan: Far West Bank; Two payments $5,^88.59 per month 
Equipment: Steve Lov;e Equipment $511.62 for 60 Months 
Duffs 
Big V Associates $3,046 per month thru December 1995 
Henries $550 pe3* month thru July 1992 
Bagley $35,000 per year thru 1996 
Diego's 
lease: Hermes 10,000 per month plus CAM, increases in 1994 
Loan: FSB $250,000 over five years
 A S% 
^ v * *%/*>wvf: (f^„ ^ H Y j^f^ ]// 
Broiler <r if 
Lease: Crossroads Plaza Assoc; Year 2009; $2,319 per month 
Loan: Zions Securities Corp S2,376.29, pay off July 1992 
Watney Broiler 
Loan: Zions Bank $1,150 appro;. 
California Hot Dog 
Lease: Crossroads Plaza; Lease $1,545 
Loan: Bank of Utah loan $1,600 per month approx, July 1992 
Di^^s^'T^s^-Qi^i}^ 
FjtfLgfit B e t t e r s ^5,000^ apprpx 
Ci^ vcahpipd 'Itefrigeration J^ffOO-'apprgK 
^\ycj&, ' ^/fTOO.app^OT 
NiJe^J^
 / ^t,02Jr^approx 
FYHTBTT "B 
1. Young Electric Sign Company in the amount of approximately $2000. 
2. NCR in the approximate amount of $ ^ 0 0 0 for the cash registers located at 
Diego's. 
/ 
